The Evans achievements

THE Canal & River Trust press release announcing the resignation of Robin Evans quotes him as saying 'I am very proud of what we have achieved over the past ten years', writes Allan Richards.

However, it is little use stating this without spelling out what British Waterways was trying to achieve under his stewardship, and measuring his performance against that.

Maintenance backlog

Robin Evans joined British Waterways as Commercial Director in 1999 and became its Chief Executive in December 2002.

Examination of British Waterways' 2002/3 Annual Report shows that its basic plan was quite simple. It was to eradicate a significant historic backlog of maintenance work (with safety work taking precedence) over a ten year period.

The report demonstrates that government were providing extra grant to enable this to be achieved, stating:

'Many years of under investment in the waterways resulted in a backlog of maintenance works, which in 1997 was valued at £260 million. In recent years government has helped to tackle this serious underfunding by increasing our annual grant by £8 million from 1999-2000 onwards, and by a further £9 million from 2002-03 onwards. The cost to eliminate the remaining backlog of maintenance at March 2003 was valued at £187 million'.

December 2012

The report also confirms a new target date for eliminating this backlog as December 2012 (the old targets are shown by doted lines). The new chief executive was so confident of achieving this that he stated: 'We want to make sure that we are never again in a position where we have a huge backlog of maintenance work.'

Just a few years later he was eating his words. In a briefing document, British Waterways' Commercial Director, James Froomberg, revealed that the backlog of maintenance was now higher than when he took office. Instead of reducing to £120m by 2007 as planned, it had actually risen to £200m.

The 2012 figure

So what is the maintenance backlog today? Well it seems that Defra don't know and CaRT won't say! A conspiracy of silence exists.

Robin Evans admitted to trustees that he has under-spent on the waterways every year since 2004. That means it must be significantly larger than the £200m stated by James Froomberg in 2007. The best estimate that can be given based on the known under-spend is that it is now about a third of a billion pounds and growing significantly each year.

Certainly this figure has been quoted in narrowboatworld on several occasions and has never been disputed by British Waterways or CaRT.

Self sufficiency

However, Robin Evans 'achievement' of running down our waterways over the ten years of his tenure rather than improving them is not his only one.

We also have his vision 'that by 2012 we will have created an expanded, vibrant, largely self-sufficient waterway network used by twice as many people as in 2002. It will be regarded as one of the nation's most important and valued national assets. Visitors will be delighted by the experience and as a consequence many will become active participants'.

By self sufficiency he meant his reliance on government grant. Now lets think about that for a moment. When he took office government was happily giving extra grant so that British Waterways could reduce its maintenance backlog. Here is Robin Evans saying quite publicly that he does not need this extra money because he cannot only eliminate the backlog but can also reduce dependence on grant.

What has only become apparent in the last few months is that just over ten years ago government arranged a loan for British Waterways to help develop its commercial interests. It is almost certain that some sort of understanding existed that in return for the loan British Waterways' grant support would be reduced due to increased financial returns from joint ventures.

A good deal for Government perhaps but a death blow for the waterways!

Targets not met

As the graph shows, Robin Evans was set targets to reduce British Waterways' dependence on Defra grant from £62.8m in 2004/5 to just £23.2m in 2013/14. As an example of how badly the chief executive failed to meet his targets we shall take the financial year of 2010/11. He told MP's of the All Party Parliamentary Waterways group that British Waterways had a Defra grant of £47m in the year but really needed be given another £39m. Thus he needed some £86m in grant. That's over £40m more than his self sufficiency target.

Quite simply he was going in the wrong direction and becoming more dependent on government grant rather than less.

Needless to say, CaRT yet has to repay the loan that was arranged by government ten years previously to kick-start it's property ambitions.

Blame government

British Waterways tried to blame government for its funding problems. However, the fact is that Robin Evans self sufficiency aspirations and British Waterways' high risk strategy with its property portfolio were the direct cause of his personal downfall. Government has always given him more money than he originally said he needed.

British Waterways has also tried to blame the economic downturn. However, the warning signs were there long before British Waterways' commercial crash in 2008/9. Indeed, its first commercial disaster was Watergrid as documented in its 2004/5 Annual Report. Since then it has been one disaster after another with schemes to acquire a hundred pubs, build thousands of houses and retail outlets all failing despite British Waterways pouring in millions of pounds to prop them up.

The other achievement

Whilst considering his 'achievements', it would be remiss not to mention delivery of public benefit. Whilst boaters contribute to the waterways via licence and mooring fees the government contributes because they perceive that the waterways deliver public benefit. As part of his 2012 vision, the chief executive undertook to double public benefit as measured by visitor numbers.

British Waterways' 2002/3 Annual report quotes him: 'I want to substantially increase the number of visitors to the inland waterways in the next decade'. The graph shows the yearly targets he was set and below is shown those targets followed by his achievement against them taken from annual reports (the figures are annual average fortnightly visitors in millions).

Year Target Actual
2003/4 3.6      3.2
2004/5 3.7      2.85
2005/6 4.0     2.85
2006/7 4.5     Not published
2007/8 5.0     Not published
2008/9 5.7     3.4
2009/10 6.5  4.3
2010/11 6.9  3.8
2011/12 7.2  3.6

Despite spending up to £5m a year marketing the waterways, Robin Evans has failed to double visitor numbers. Indeed, it would be absolutely correct to say that he has failed to increase them at all! What makes it worse, is the crude attempts made in the annual reports to hide this failure.

Four Square

For anyone who wonders why he got away with it for so long, it has to be said that British Waterways have been ruthless in dealing with those that they believe oppose them or even question them. In recent weeks we have had narrowboatworld's Ralph Freeman targeted. We have also had a boater threatened with libel action and the chairman of a boater organisation forced to make a grovelling apology. We even have narrowboatworld's editor stating that this publication is being targeted due to the views expressed here (this despite the many articles from trustees, directors and managers of CaRT that he publishes).

As such, CaRT is simply carrying on in the long British Waterways tradition.

Of course, some give the benefit of the doubt or simply refuse to believe, dismissing it as a load of hot air. Perhaps this Four Square 'case study' may convince.

The case study

Some time back, a lobbying company published a 'case study' on its website. Within 24 hours the web page was removed, but not before a narrowboatworld reader had taken a screenshot.

The 'case study' reads: 'BW approached Four Public Affairs in 2005 when it faced negative publicity from a hostile group of activists, who were opposed to the way the organisation was moving as a public corporation. Their opponents' main accusation was that British Waterways were focusing on commercial ventures at the expense of waterway users. Four's task was to turn the situation around, and ensure that misinformation was countered and that advocates were in place to support BW's cause'.

Activists? Well, one supposes it is slightly less offensive than being called a terrorist.

The solution

Four's 'case study' goes on to explain its solution: 'Four’'s campaign involved developing new political contacts for BW, as well as establishing clear messaging channels including a newsletter, a presence at party conferences, and hosting regular parliamentary events'.

....and the outcome

'BW now has a strong network of political advocates, helping to heighten and sharpen its profile. It is playing a key part in the 2012 Olympics, and is consistently mentioned favourably in Parliament'.

What this 'case study' demonstrates is that just two or three years after taking office some very serious questions were being asked in high places about British Waterways' direction under Robin Evans leadership.

....and British Waterways stamped on it

Failures not achievements

At the start of this rather long article, Robin Evans is quoted as saying 'I am very proud of what we have achieved over the past ten years'. However, what British Waterways was trying to achieve under his leadership is well documented either in annual reports or personal targets he was set. Whilst it is certain he would wish to move the goalposts and be judged on something as nebulous as 'moving to a trust' or 'providing certainty of funding'. However, he can only really be judged on what he set out to do over his ten year tenure. His achievements are failures!

Failure to eliminate maintenance backlog by the end of 2012.
Failure to reduce reliance on government grant.
Failure to increase public benefit.

....and he says he is very proud.